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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate the enterprise of exploiting lexical 
semantic knowledge for discourse purposes. In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate 
that event-based approaches are unable to explain the ambiguous behavior of light verb 
have with a verbal complement. Asher and Lascarides (2003) present a promising 
account of lexicalized causation that shows the dependence of verbs on the discourse 
context. In the second part of the paper, I use the main tools of Segmented Discourse 
Representation Theory (henceforth SDRT) to deal with the phenomena, improve 
SDRT’s strategy to deal with lexical knowledge and avoid the previous pitfalls of the 
usual event-based theories. 
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1. Light Verb have 
1.1 The Basic Phenomenon and Analysis 
The English light verb have with a verbal complement is ambiguous. 
 
(1a)  John (causer/experiencer) had his students walk out of class. 
(1b) The CIA director (experiencer) had an agent die on him. 
(1c) The CIA director (causer) had the agent killed. 
 
In (1b) and (1c) the interpretation of the subject of have is clear whereas in (1a) John 
could either cause the event denoted by the complement, or undergo its consequences as 
an experiencer. Most of the existing approaches (Bevlin 1993, Cowper 1989, Ritter and 
Rosen 1991, 1993, 1997, Harley 1998, McIntyre 2005) claim cases like (1a) are 
ambiguous and that the inherent meaning of have, if any, is not able to specify the 
semantics of its argument. Instead, the interpretation depends on the contextual material 
within the clause. 
Ritter and Rosen (1993), for example, propose a complex predicate analysis. They 
see have as a light verb which lacks an event specification and combines with the 
eventuality denoted by the embedded predicate and which is able to contribute an 
argument to the complex predicate. However, being light, have does not possess any 
inherent meaning and its only role is, according to them, to add one more participant to 
the event brought by the complement. The syntactic context is sufficient to specify its 
meaningful contribution to the construct. In that sense, the causer and experiencer 
readings of have are effects of the role the argument of have can play in the event. Ritter 
and Rosen (1993, 1997) also suggest that in the causative reading of the subject of have, 
the single event is extended backwards in time, since the indirect causer acts in advance 
to initiate the event denoted by the complement. In the experiencer interpretation the 
event is extended forwards reflecting the way the subject of have is influenced by the 
event denoted by the complement. For (1b) in the causer reading and (1c) in the 
experiencer one, the analysis would look as in (2a) and (2b), respectively. 
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(2a) Have&die |—an agent died—||—The CIA director (experiencer)–| 
(2b) Have&kill |— The CIA director (causer)—||—the agent killed—| 
 
1.2 Make vs. Have 
In its causative reading, have shows similarities with analytic causative verbs like make 
with a verbal complement. Ritter and Rosen’s analysis of light have in the causative 
reading looks very similar to analyses proposed for other periphrastic causative verbs 
like make. However, Ritter and Rosen (1993, 1997) assume a one-event analysis for the 
complex predicate of have. Make is assumed to contribute its own event independently 
of the event denoted by the complement. Reasons for this are, for example, that in (3a), 
the negation has scope over the distinct event brought by make, whereas the resulting 
event could also be left out of its scope. That means that the making is negated but not 
necessarily the writing. Therefore, the following but-clause is perfectly acceptable and 
able to convey the contrast to the matrix clause. In (3b) on the other hand, the negation 
is addressed to the single event of the complex predicate. When the causing–of–the–
writing is negated, the writing is also negated and, thus, the example is unacceptable 
with the contrasting clause. 
 
(3a) The teacher didn’t make Bill write the article, but he did it anyway. 
(3b) #The teacher didn’t have Bill write the article, but he did it anyway. 
 
In (4a) the stopped smoking lasts only as long as the subject of have has the control over 
it. In a driving context, the state of the cessation of the smoking ends by the time the 
context changes. Such interpretation involves a number of extralinguistic inferences; 
namely, it is tacitly assumed or inferred that Sue does not allow smokers to enter in the 
same car with her and that this is why the smoking cannot take place while she is in the 
control of what is happening inside the car. The disruption of the smoking is a state that 
is caused because of the specific context and it ends by the time the context ceases to 
exist.  
 
(4a) Sue had Mary stop smoking.  
(4b) Sue made Mary stop smoking.  
 
On the other hand, make obtains a second reading apart from the one mentioned for 
have. According to this second reading, Mary becomes a non-smoker. The reason why 
in (4a) one cannot take the second acceptable interpretation for (4b) is that there is a 
single complex event with specific spatiotemporal restrictions that do not allow its 
causing and resulting parts to occur independently. However, in (4b) the causing event 
is considered to be independent and to not affect the temporal contour of the resulting 
state. Linguistically, then, make has its own properties that do not determine and 
interfere with the denotation of the state in the complement. In the former case, the 
stopping of smoking is tightly connected to Sue’s causing action and in the later one it 
lasts from that point on forever with Sue causing its initiation but not determining its 
ending point. As a side-effect, in the first common reading for both have and make, Sue 
is considered the controller of the cessation state. 
 
2. Towards a New Account 
Notwithstanding the appeal of the arguments of Ritter and Rosen (1993), I suggest that 
they are not conclusive for a single event analysis of the complex predicate of have and 
that a more subtle study of the data will prove that it is not enough to invalidate the 
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assumption about two events; it just contributes to a refined analysis of the kind of 
causation brought about by have.  
The objection against a single event analysis for the complex predicate of have+V is 
illustrated by the following argument. If we accept, at all, such things as events in our 
ontological quiver then one should be able to refer to such entities explicitly with 
anaphoric means like pronouns. In (5) the pronoun it clearly does not refer to any 
individual entity but to an event-like or abstract object (in terms of Asher (1993)) of the 
previous sentence. However, it is not the event of walking out of class that the pronoun 
refers to, but the causing action by the subject of have. Therefore, since we are able to 
talk about the causing part of the complex predicate and build anaphora with it in the 
same way that we could do with any other analytic causative verb as in (6) that denotes 
a causing and a resulting event, it should be reasonable to argue that the complex 
predicate with have introduces two events and not one as all the previous analyses 
assume. 
 
(5) I had John walk out of class. It was the only thing that was left to do. 
(6) I made John walk out of class. It was the only thing that was left to do. 
 
This point is further illustrated by the discourse in (7). There are six events preceding 
the fighting in (7). The interpretation of this small passage is that these six events result 
in the event of fighting in the last sentence. The coherence of the interpretation depends 
on the right inference about the connection between the two sentences. Under the single 
event analysis of have by Ritter and Rosen (1993, 1997), the relevant inference cannot 
be done. If there is only one event that has fight as its main predication, then it is not 
possible to explain how humans interpret the causal relation between the six events of 
the context and the resulting fighting. 
 
(7)  John went to pick Mary up for the dance (e1). When he met her at her place (e2) 
she was still washing the dishes (e3). He became angry (e4) and when they 
reached the place where the dance was taking place (e5), he insulted her very 
badly (e6). Finally, he had her fight with him. 
 
The above data reflect a more general problem present in event-based accounts, as 
already noticed in the literature (Asher (1993) a.o.). Lexical semanticists following Link 
(1983) have used different kinds of algebras of events to explain different linguistic 
phenomena. For example, Krifka (1989), driven by data regarding the denotational 
mapping properties of creation/consumption verbs and their mass or count noun objects, 
proposed an algebraic approach extending the axiomatic principles of Link (1983) and 
provided valuable insights as to under what operations the domain of events should be 
closed. A number of other approaches for different linguistic concerns have emerged 
after these first algebraic formulations. Like Link (1983) and Krifka (1989), all the new 
approaches presuppose the existence of events as a structured domain, since an 
axiomatic method is developed most of the times. That means that specific operations 
should be able to contain all and only the truths regarding the behavior of events in a 
well-defined domain. 
Asher (1993) and Tantos (2006) provide a detailed and useful discussion about the 
deficiencies of algebras of events and their weaknesses by observing simple cases of 
very small texts or even sentences with more than one clause. Although I will not 
present the relevant discussion due to space limits, one can prove that any algebraic 
method of event computation is doomed to fail if one considers the semantics of verbs 
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in a larger context; following Asher (1993) and Tantos (2006), it is the way that we use 
language that plays the most important role most of the times in connecting happenings 
in the world rather than the nature of the happenings themselves. It has been noticed, 
mainly by philosophers, that natural language admits the existence of a number of 
objects other than events covering a wide spectrum in the scale of abstractness, events 
being only one of them. Moreover, there is no clear empirically defined principle that 
could identify events. At best, only a context-sensitive approach is viable for these 
semi-concrete or purely abstract objects appeared in natural language. If the context of 
the utterance plays such a big role, then why should we seek an explanation of 
ambiguities like that of light have only in terms of events and the relations of their sub-
events?  
As next section shows, it turns out that the context is actually the most important 
factor in determining the semantic contribution of causative verbs and the complex 
predicate of have and not their event denotation. Before considering any discourse-
sensitive analysis of the complex predicate of have, though, it is essential to establish a 
framework that would allow such an interaction. 
 
3. The Lexicon-Discourse Interface 
Context plays a large role in the interpretation of light have. This may not seem like 
startling news, as most of lexical semanticists would concur with this idea. However, 
their analyses leave out the contextual factor. A central part of Ritter and Rosen’s and 
Harley’s analysis is the identification of conditions of the clause that could serve to 
license/specify either only a causative, or only an experiencer reading. My analysis, in 
contrast, assumes that light have along with other causative verbs is a discourse active 
element, which indicate that a particular kind of discoursal connection between bits of 
texts should be established via rhetorical relations. At the same time, any seeming 
difficulties regarding the denotational properties of the complex predicate fade away, 
since the account is not event-related. Pieces of structural lexical semantic information 
correspond to discourse-related entities -and not events- that allow for anaphora and 
connectivity at the discourse level. The lexical specification of have thus interacts 
directly with the discourse structure and this, in turn, serves to specify the predication of 
light have plus the main verb. 
Asher and Lascarides (2003) follow the same strategy for exploiting lexical semantic 
knowledge for discourse inference within SDRT. Lets us revisit some points of the last 
mentioned authors for the representation of a simple causative verb. 
Structures of SDRT, SDRSs, are labeled by πis, which then become arguments of 
rhetorical relations like Narration, Elaboration, Explanation among others. Labeling 
becomes then an essential part for the first task of a discourse dynamic theory; namely 
the construction of the logical form of the discourse. The mapping of the logical form to 
a model is the second step of the interpretation and goes along with the argumentation 
that a number of types of linguistic information exist but only have a partial relation to 
types of real world information and make inferences more convenient for humans. 
SDRT, then, provides us with the necessary flexibility to deal with the problems related 
to lexically predicated events. Although the basic ideas about the lexicon-discourse 
interface developed by Asher and Lascarides (2003) provide the basis for a solution to 
the event-related paradoxes noted by Tantos (2006), their representation does not take 
full advantage of the labeling scheme and do not avoid the problems of the event-based 
approaches. 
Despite the fact that Asher and Lascarides (2003) adopt lexical πis in their 
approaches, their analyses still appeal to predications of events entering again the 
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problems explicated above. These labels are containers of coherent bits of information 
that is available for anaphora by other bits of information in the context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
π π1 
e’
π 
λeλyλx 
?Act-on(e’,x,y) 
sink(e,x,y) 
abuts(e’,e) π1 
Result(π, π1)  
Figure 1: The lexical representation of sink from Asher and Lascarides(2003) 
 
The representation of the causative verb sink in Figure 1 is used in Asher and 
Lascarides (2003). Parts of event and argument structure are dealt within πis. The 
complex SDRS in Figure (1) is triggered by the lexical predicate sink, is bound under 
the lambda operators and is available for composition inside and outside the sentence. 
Two utterance tokens represent the causing and the resulting part of the denotation. The 
relation between them is Result and is of the same kind as the rhetorical relations, 
inferred between textual parts.  
There are two events distributed in the two different πis. One of them, the causing 
event, is not predicated of by any linguistic predicate from the clausal context. Instead, 
its predication is filled in with a question mark that indicates underspecification. 
Although Asher and Lascarides (2003) do not explicate their algorithm, it should 
involve essentially two steps. The underspecified predicate of the causing denotation of 
sink is resolved if a predicate from the anaphorically accessible context is typed as an 
Act–on predicate in accordance with the typed underspecified predicate of the lexical 
entry for sink. If that is the case, the questioned event predication is replaced by the 
linguistic predicate provide by the context and their event variables are identified as 
well. Else the underspecified predicate remains as it is.1 
This means that the context of the utterance provides event descriptions to resolve 
the underspecification implied by such questioned predications. These event 
descriptions or utterance tokens may contribute information about the event of the 
causing part of the denotation of sink. In (8) the causing-of-the-sinking is identified with 
the torpedoing and the lexically triggered complex SDRSs is integrated in the rhetorical 
structure of the text smoothly in a process that reminds of anaphora resolution. Based 
exclusively on lexical semantic knowledge, the connection between the two sentences is 
Result. 
 
                                                 
1 The theory allows for the possibility that underspecified information remains underspecified if there is 
no way to resolve it. However, the reasoning is based on the preference that underspecification, wherever 
it is found, should be resolved if possible. 
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(8) (π1) The enemy sank the boat. (π2) They torpedoed it. 
 
This idea of separating the reference to πis and to events renders discourse inference 
extremely flexible and explains a number of confusing phenomena. However, a problem 
with the resolution of underspecified questioned predicates emerges with sentences with 
more than one predicate that describe the causing part of the denotation of a causative 
verb. In (9), the torpedoing and the burning occurred in different times and places. 
However, both refer to the causing part of the denotation of sink. There is no 
contradiction as to what caused the sunk state as both of the temporally preceding event 
descriptions serve as describing parts of the utterance token that describes a bigger 
event. The temporal boundaries of the causing-of-sinking are specified on the basis of 
the events of the surrounding utterances. Its beginning is identified with the beginning 
of the exploding and its ending point is the end of the burning. There is again an event 
predicated of by a linguistic predicate and further described by predications of two 
events creating inconsistencies in the motivation of the underspecified questioned 
predicates. 
 
(9) The enemy sank the boat. They torpedoed the stern and burned the forrard half 
an hour later. 
 
Let us assume that the underspecification expressed by the question mark in sink is 
resolved by a single predicate. Then, one would be forced to conclude that only one of 
these predicates correspond to the causing-of-the-sinking event and this is not correct, 
since both of them play an independent and essential role for bringing about the sunk 
state. 
 
4. Proposal 
The real novelty of the idea of including πis in lexical semantic representations as 
containers of event descriptions is only exploited when computation is not based 
exclusively on the events they express but on the way they express them. A single event 
may be described in more than one πi or the other way around. This idea is not clear in 
the existing framework of SDRT and in the case of causative verbs above each πi 
expresses its own event. 
The first step is to assume that there is not any kind of anaphora resolution of an 
underspecified predicate involved in the inference of the relevant discourse connections 
between sentences of a discourse in which at least one of these sentences contains 
complex SDRSs with lexical rhetorical relations. This is done in order to avoid the 
difficulty that emerges from the event-based account of Asher and Lascarides (2003) 
explicated above. The level of utterance tokens –and not of events- becomes the right 
place to seek the relevant connection between the causing denotation of the causative 
verb and the explicit segment of the context. The analysis of event structure is not at the 
same level with the level of descriptions of events as mentioned often above. There is 
no one-to-one correspondence between events and πis. 
The second step is to establish the framework that ensures smooth integration of 
lexical complex SDRSs in the segmentation process of SDRT. This means that various 
kinds of redundancies and inconveniencies should be avoided without violating general 
principles of the theory. I demonstrate both of these steps in the analysis of the light 
verb have. 
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Figure 2: The representation of causative light have as a complex predicate 
 
I believe that the confusing behavior of have is explained if one assumes that the object 
that this lexical item denotes is a linguistic construct of the kind SDRT assumes. Under 
the new framework, the lexical representation of have in its causative reading is 
depicted in Figure 2. For the above representation, I assume a compositional version of 
SDRT for assembling semantic information in a similar fashion to Asher and 
Lascarides’ (2003) approach. Some comments about the compositional properties of the 
lexical entry are necessary to also grasp the intuitiveness of this approach.2 First of all, I 
assume that there should be no mention about underspecified predicates in the lexical 
entry of the verb in order to avoid the problem of identifying more than one event in the 
context with the causing part of the denotation of have. The lexical information 
contributes to discourse inference, and linguistic clues about the nature of its subject 
argument may be exploited in order to allow the right rhetorical connection of the 
sentence it contains it with others in the context. 
Moving towards the second step mentioned above, I adopt a different status for 
lexical (πlis) and discourse (πis) tokens. In favor of the lexically-sensitive analysis and 
the distinction between lexical and discourse πis that motivate the necessary technical 
changes to the theory, there is one more motivating argument with respect to a discourse 
constraint, called the Right Frontier Constraint. This constraint demonstrates the 
hierarchical structure of the discourse and the different effects of coordinating and 
subordinating relations in the resolution of various sorts of anaphora. Coordinating 
relations reflect the binary connections between bits of text information that support a 
common topic. Both of the rhetorical arguments offer some new information in a 
common direction without suggesting any asymmetry between them. On the other hand, 
subordinating connections are developed between segments, when some of these 
segments play a subordinate role relative to the others.  
The lexical SDRSs are packaged in a single lexical item. Therefore, lexically-
triggered relations do not provide the interpreter with any clue as to whether they should 
be considered as symmetric in the relevant sense or not and they are not defined as 
either coordinating or subordinating. In my opinion, the structure of the text determines 
                                                 
2 Due to space limits a full-fledged example of semantic composition for a sentence with the complex 
predicate of have is not provided, but I think it is obvious how it would be done. 
Result(πl1, πl2) 
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the coordinating or subordinating nature of the rhetorical relations and the lexically-
triggered ones do not participate in this distinction with all the relevant effects in the 
resolution of various kinds of discourse anaphora.  
Moving back to the light verb have in its V+V construction, in the above lexical 
semantic representation have determines only one formal part of the complex predicate. 
The λ function operator ranges over the information that comes from the verbal 
complement. The semantics of the verbal complement labeled by some other πi takes its 
place as the Result of πli after the conversion. 
Lambda reduction becomes then the operation that signals the elimination of the 
lexical πi. As it was argued above, this is a desirable change for our theory that reflects 
the lexical nature of the constituents that are lexically triggered and are available for 
discourse purposes. The advantages of representing the meaning of the complex 
predicate this way can be illustrated with the help of an example. 
 
π3=πl
π1 π2 Narration 
π6 
π5 Result 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Discourse graph based on coreference of lexical πi s with discourse πis in (9). 
 
The structure of the discourse in (10) is illustrated in Figure 3 and needs some comment. 
π5 is the discourse πi that derives from the embedded complement and results after the 
lambda reduction mentioned above and the elimination of the lexical πi of the lexical 
entry of light have. At the same time, the identification of (π3) with (πl4) is necessary 
and shows that the coordinating structure of the previous two clauses serves as the 
causing denotation that results in the event denoted by the complement. 
 
(10) (π6)[( π3)[( π1)The bartender took a crate of beer and (π2)threw it at the head of 
the drunk haunter].He (πl4)( π5) had him go to the hospital]. 
 
From the example above, one can see that the right discourse relations are built between 
the three constituents with the help of the lexically triggered information in a way that 
was not possible in the previous standard SDRT. There is no one-to-one correspondence 
between lexical πis and events and that is why one can avoid the difficulties of using 
directly the internal structure of events. At the same time, a single event may be 
described by more than one lexical πi. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The paper aimed at showing the need to use discourse-motivated entities of lexical 
nature with respect to the light verb have in its verbal complement construction. 
Intermediate entities that serve discourse connectedness in the form of lexical πis are 
necessary in order to determine the semantic contribution of light have and, more 
generally, they play an important role in the discourse inference. I also demonstrated the 
need for incorporating lexically-triggered πis in SDRT and presented the lexical entry of 
 Computing Discourse Connections with Lexical Information: The Case of Light Have 363 
have in its causative reading along with the analysis of a real example.  
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